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ALTERNATIVE MODEL 
OF FUZZY NTU COALITIONAL GAME 
MILAN MAREŠ AND MILAN VLACH 
One of the possible models of fuzzification of non-transferable utility (NTU) coalitional 
games was extensively treated in [4]. In this paper, we suggest an alternative structure 
of fuzzification of the NTU games, where for every coalition a fuzzy class of (generally 
crisp) sets of its admissible pay-off vectors is considered. It is shown that this model of 
a fuzzy coalitional game can be represented by a fuzzy class of deterministic NTU games, 
and its basic concepts like the superadditivity or the core can be transparently introduced 
by means of that class of games. 
Keywords: coalitional games, non-transferable utility, fuzzy quantity, fuzzy cooperative 
game, core of a game, superadditivity 
AMS Subject Classification: 91A12, 03E72 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The non-transferable utility (NTU) coalitional games, sometimes called also games 
without side-payments or general coalitional games, represent the model of cooper-
ation in which the members of coalitions coordinate their strategical activities but 
each of them obtains his individual pay-off which either cannot be transferred to 
other members of the coalition or the transfer is subjected to some deformations 
of the utility (see, e.g., [2] and also [4, 5, 6]). In fact, the NTU coalitional model 
can be interpreted as a generalization of the classical transferable utility coalitional 
games as shown, e. g., in the publications referred above. 
As the coalitional cooperation is negotiated before starting the practical realiza-
tion of the game, the expected pay-offs can be only estimated. The hidden assump-
tion of the classical deterministic game theory about the absolute exactness of this 
estimation appears to be unrealistic. In many practical cooperative situations the 
idea of coalitions about their expected outcome is more or less vague, which in the 
formal definition means fuzzy. 
In the classical deterministic coalitional game theory, the coalitional pay-offs in 
an NTU game are represented by closed subsets of a multidimensional Euclidean 
space fulfilling certain quite natural conditions (briefly recalled in Section 2). Then 
the fuzzification of this concept can be done in two quite different ways. One of them 
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is used in [3, 4, 5, 6] and it consists in the substitution of the deterministic pay-off 
sets by fuzzy subsets of the multidimensional space. The alternative approach, used 
below, is to consider fuzzy classes of the (crisp) pay-off subsets of the space. The 
interpretations of both approaches are evident. In the former case the expectation 
of particular pay-off vectors is considered as being vague, whereas in the latter 
case the complete expected sets of results are connected with uncertainty. The 
latter approach can be interpreted also in the way that several different coalitional 
games with different possibilities are potentially possible and the choice of the game 
which will be realized is connected with the possibilities (i. e. values of membership 
functions) of the corresponding sets of pay-offs. This interpretation also implies the 
method used for the processing of these fuzzy games in this paper. 
In the following sections the original deterministic model is briefly recalled, and 
the principle of its fuzzification by means of the latter of the two approaches men-
tioned above is suggested. Some of its elementary properties are established and its 
relation to the fuzzification method described in [4] is briefly discussed. 
2. DETERMINISTIC NTU COALITIONAL GAME 
Let I be a nonempty finite set. Without loss of generality we assume that I = 
{1, 2 , . . . , n) where n is a positive integer. The elements of I are called players and 
the subsets of I are called coalitions. The n-dimensional real vector space of all 
n-tuples x = (x\, #2, • • •, %n) of real numbers is denoted by R n . We assume that R n 
is equipped with a norm. If x = (.Zi,;r2,... ,xn) and y = (2/1,2/2, •• • ,2/n) from R
n 
are such that yi < X{ for all i G / , then we write y < x or x > y. 
Definition 2.1. Let V be a mapping assigning to each coalition K a subset V(K) 
of R n . The ordered pair (7, V) is said to be a deterministic NTU coalitional game 
(NTU game for short) if the mapping V has the following properties: 
(2.1) Each V(K) is a nonempty closed subset of R n . 
(2.2) V(K) = R n if and only if K = 0. 
(2.3) If x G V(K) and y{ < x{ for all i G K, then y G V(K). 
The elements of V(K) are called V(K)-imputations. 
Each set V(K) can be described as the set of vectors in R n for which coalition 
K is effective in the sense that if x G V(K) then coalition K can obtain pay-off x\ 
for each i G K n o matter what the coalition N \K does. 
An important class of NTU games is the class of superadditive games defined as 
follows. 
Definition 2.2. A deterministic NTU coalitional game (7, V) is called superaddi-
tive if 
V(KUL) DV(K)nV(L) 
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for each pair of disjoint coalition K and L. 
We are also interested in one of the basic solution concepts, namely, the core of 
a game. To define the core of an NTU game, we first introduce the following two 
auxiliary notions. 
Let x and y be points in R n and let K be a coalition. We say that x dominates 
y via K, and write x dom^ y, if 
— Xi >Vi for all i G K, and 
— Xj > yj for some j G K. 
Using this binary relation of domination, we define, for each coalition K, the subset 
V*(K) of R n as the set of those points in R n that are not dominated via K by 
points from V(K). It follows that y G V*(K) if and only if, for each x G V(K), 
either yi > Xi for some i G K, or j/j = Xi for all i G K. 
The set V*(K) is called the superoptimum of coalition K, and the intersection 
P(K) = V(K)f\V*(K) 
is called the Pareto optimum of K. Notice that the superoptimum of each coalition 
is nonempty and that V*(<b) = Rn . 
Definition 2.3. Let (7, V) be an NTU coalitional game. The set Cy defined by 
cv = v(i)n( P\v*(K)) 
\KCI ) 
is called the core of game (/, V). 
In other words, a point y G R n belongs to the core of game (/, V) if and only 
if it is a y(/)-imputation and such that, for each coalition K, no F( i f )-imputation 
dominates y via K. 
In the following sections we denote by V(K) for every K C / , the class of all sets 
V(K) fulfilling (2.1), (2.2), (2.3). 
3. FUZZY NTU COALITIONAL GAMES 
As indicated in the Introduction, the concept of deterministic NTU coalitional games 
can be fuzzified in various ways. 
One of the possibilities is to substitute the sets V(K) by fuzzy subsets of R n . 
This approach was used, e.g., in [4, 5, 6], and it is also mentioned in Section 7 of 
this paper. In this section we introduce an alternative concept of fuzzy NTU games 
that seems to be quite natural, and which, to our best knowledge, has not been 
considered in the literature. 
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Definition 3 .1 . Let W be a mapping assigning to each coalition K a fuzzy subset 
W(K) of V(K). The ordered pair (I, W) is said to be a proper fuzzy NTU coalitional 
game (fuzzy NTU game for short). The membership function of W(K) is denoted 
Note that since V(0) = {R n } , the domain of definition of IT™ has only one 
element. Throughout this paper we consider only games (I, W) with ^ ( R 7 1 ) = 1. 
Also note that the set of deterministic NTU coalitional games can naturally be 
embedded into the set of fuzzy NTU coalitional games as follows. 
Let (I,V) be a deterministic NTU game. For each coalition K C I, define 
^ : V ( i T ) - > [ 0 , l ] b y 
^ i / 1 "A-V^ 
\0 HAeV(K)\{V(K)}. 
Then the game (I, V) can be identified with game (J, W) for which 
IT™ = o\ for each K C 7. 
Definition 3.2. Let (7, V) be a deterministic NTU game. Every fuzzy NTU game 
(I, W) with the property 
TT^(V(K)) = 1 for each K Cl 
is called a proper fuzzy extension of game (7, V). 
In this section, we have formalized the main principle of fuzzification of NTU 
coalitional principle considered in this paper. We do not substitute the deterministic 
sets V(K) by fuzzy subsets of R n , as it was done, e. g., in [4, 5, 6]. Such method leads 
to formal complications whenever the model is to be processed (e. g., the superoptima 
V*(-) can be defined and handled with significant difficulties, only). Here, we are to 
manage the fuzzy classes of possible deterministic sets V(K) for every coalition K. It 
can be simply verified that the processing of such model is much easier. Moreover, 
it can be easily and naturally extended into fuzzy class of complete NTU games 
(where each of them is deterministic), as it is shown in the next section and used in 
the following parts of this paper. 
4. FUZZY CLASSES OF NTU COALITIONAL GAMES 
Let V(I) be the set of all deterministic NTU games over 7 and let (7,>V) be a 
proper fuzzy NTU coalitional game. Furthermore, let pw . V(I) —> [0,1] be a 
function defined on V(I) by 
Pw{I,V) = mmn™{V{K)). (4.1) 
We denote the fuzzy subset of V(I) whose membership function is pw by G(W), 
and say that G(>V) is generated by game (7, W). 
The following example shows that two different games (7, Wi) and (7, W2) can 
generate the same fuzzy subset of V(I), that is, G(W\) may be equal to G(W2)-
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Example 4.1. Let / = {1,2} and let (/, V0) be a game from V(I). Moreover, let 
(/, Wi) and (/, W2) be fuzzy NTU games such that 
ir{Vl(%({0») = l, ^\(Vo({l})) = \ , ^}(Vb({2})) = lJ ^ } ( % ( { 1 , 2 } ) ) = 1 
TT^1 (A) = 0 for all K C / and A G V(K) such that A ^ V0(K)i 
VT0
V V 2(^({0})) = 1, 7r{
vy2(y0({l})) = l, ^ }(Vo({2})) = lJ ^ 2 } ( V o ( { l , 2 } ) ) = ^ J 
TT^2(A) = 0 for all K C / and _4 G V(if) such that A ^ V0(K). 
Simple calculations show that 
pm(I,V0) = pm(I,V0) = —, 
pm (/, V) = pw2 (/, V) = 0 for (/, V) with V^V0. 
Therefore G(Wi) = G(W2), although Wi 7- W2. 
Observe that the games (/, Wi) and (/, W2) in the above example are not proper 
fuzzy extensions of any game in V(I), because the values pwi(/ , V) and pw2(/ , V) 
are different from 1 for every game (/, V) G V(I). In contrast to the example, the 
following lemma shows that the fuzzy subsets G(Wi) and G(W2) are different if they 
are generated by different proper fuzzy extensions of a deterministic NTU game. 
L e m m a 4 . 1 . If (/, Wi) and (/, W2) are two different proper fuzzy extensions of a 
deterministic NTU game, then pwi / Pw2-
P r o o f . Let (/, Wi) and (/, W2) be proper fuzzy extensions of a game (/, V0) G 
V(I) such that Wi / W2. We wish to show that there is a game (/, V) G V(I) such 
that pwi (/, V) 7-- pw2(/ , V). From the assumption that Wi 7-̂  W2, we have 
TT™1 (A) / Trf2 (A) for some L C / and A G V(L). 
Let V be defined by 
(V0(K) fovK^L, 
I A for K = L. 
Then 
m ( / , V) = rmnn^(V(K)) = ^(V(L)) = *™(A), 
KC.I 
pm{I,V) = mmn^(V(K)) = «™>{V(L)) = i$>{A)\ 
KC.I 
Since ir^1 (A) / -K^2(A)} we conclude that pwi / Pw2-
 n 
The above results show that a fuzzy class of (deterministic) NTU games can be 
derived from proper fuzzy NTU coalitional games. 
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5. SUPERADDITIVITY 
Let (J, Vo) be a deterministic NTU coalitional game, and let Vo be the set of all 
proper fuzzy extensions of (I, Vo). Every (I, W) game from Vo generates a fuzzy 
subset G(W) oiV(I) whose membership function pw is given by (4.1). Using these 
membership functions, we associate with each game (I, Vo) G V(I) a fuzzy subset of 
Vo whose membership function ay0(I, W) : Vo -> [0,1] is defined by 
aVo(I,W) = sup p w (7,10 
where the supremum is taken over all superadditive games from V(I). 
Evidently, the membership Junction cry0(VV) defines a fuzzy subset of proper fuzzy 
coalitional games which can be, with some possibility, considered for superadditive. 
T h e o r e m 5.1. If (/, W) is a proper extension of a deterministic NTU coalitional 
game (I, Vo) and if (I, Vo) is superadditive, then a(I,W) — 1. 
P r o o f . From the definition of proper fuzzy extensions, we have 
n%(V0(K)) = 1 for each Kcl. 
Therefore 
mmn$(V0{K)) = l. 
As (I, Vo) is superadditive, we obtain 
a (I, W) = sup{pw(I, V)\(I, V) is superadditive} = 1.
 D 
T h e o r e m 5.2. Let (I, Wi) and (I, W2) be proper fuzzy coalitional games. If 
*K' (A) > ^K2(A) f o r all if C / and A G V(K), then <r(/, Wi) > a(I, W2). 
P r o o f . From the assumption on the membership functions of Wi (K) and W2 (K), 
we have 
pm(I,V) = mmn^(V(K)) > mmn™>(V(K)) = ^ ( J , 7 ) 
for each (I, V) G V(I). It follows 
sup{pwi(I,V)\(I,V) is superadditive} > sup{pW2(I,V)\(I,V) is superadditive}. 
D 
The approach to the fuzziness of a coalitional game, used in this section, is natural 
and evident. Instead of "translating" the definition of some property of a game (in 
our case it was the superadditivity) in the language of fuzzy set theory, we rather 
find the possibility with which the fuzzy class of NTU games extending the original 
game contains also some superadditive elements. This strategy simplifies the formal 
processing of the conception of fuzzification of coalitional games, and we can use it 
also in the case of other game theoretical concepts. 
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6. CORES OF PROPER FUZZY GAMES 
The further concept which we try to define and process by means of the fuzzy 
subclass of NTU games representing the vagueness of the results of negotiation, is 
the concept of core. Let us consider a proper fuzzy NTU coalitional game W which 
is connected, in the sense of (4.1) with a fuzzy class of (deterministic) NTU games 
G(W). Now, the fuzzy core of the proper fuzzy game W can be defined as a fuzzy 
subset of R n . Each imputation x belongs to the core with the possibility with which 
a game whose core contains x belongs to the fuzzy set G(W). More formally, this 
approach to the fuzziness of core can be described in the following way. 
Let (I, W) be a proper fuzzy NTU coalitional game, and let 7w : R n x V(I) -> 
[0,1] be defined by 
fpvv(J,V) i f zGCv, 
1w(x,V) = < 
[0 \ix(£Cv. 
Definition 6.1. The core of a fuzzy NTU game (I, W) is the fuzzy subset of R n 
whose membership function is the function 7w : R n -> [0,1] defined by 
7w(x) = sup{jw(x,V)\(I,V) € V(I)}. 
Theorem 6 .1 . If (I, W) is a proper fuzzy extension of a deterministic NTU coali-
tional game (7, Vo) and if the core of (J, Vo) is nonempty, then 
7w(z) = 1 for x G Cy0. 
P r o o f . From the definition of 7w, we have 1 > 7w(#) > 7w(^3 Vo). If x G Cy0, 
then 7w(x, Vo) = pw(I, Vo). Since (J, W) is a proper fuzzy extension of (7, Vo), we 
obtain p>v(/,V0) = 1- Consequently 7w(-*0 = 1.
 n 
Theorem 6.2. Let (/,>Vi) and (7, W2) be proper fuzzy coalitional games. If 
*KKX{A) > *K2(A) for all K C / and A G V(K), then 
7Wi (x) > 7w2 (
x) for all x G R n . 
P r o o f . From the assumption it follows that pwAhVo) > Pw2(-^^b) for each 
(I,V) G V(I). Therefore y^x{x) > Jw2(
x) for every x G R n and (I,V) G V(I). 
Consequently, 
7w1{x) = 8up{wi(x,V)\(I,V)eV(I)}>8up{^ 
n 
Observe that as corollaries of Theorem 6.1 and 6.2 we have, respectively, 
sup 7w0*0 = 1 
a;6Rn 
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and 
sup тwi(s) > sup jw2(
x)-
i б R n æЄRn 
7. MARGINAL NOTE ON FUZZY PAY-OFF SETS 
We have attempted to fuzzify the NTU coalitional games in some of our previous 
papers [4, 5, 6]. The approach of these papers differs significantly from that of this 
paper. For comparison, we briefly recall basic principles of our previous attempt. 
If (J, V) is a deterministic NTU coalitional game then its fuzzy extension (J, W) 
is defined in [4] as a pair in which the mapping W assigns to every coalition K C I 
a fuzzy subset W(K) of R n with membership function KK : R n —r [0,1] such that 
(7.1) {x G R n | « * (z) = 1} D V(K), 
(7.2) {x G Rn\KK(x) = 1} is closed, 
(7.3) if x,y G R n , x doni^ y then KK(X) < KK(V), 
(7.4) if K / 0 then there always exists x G R n such that KK(X) = 0. 
The properties of this model of fuzzification of an NTU game are summarized 
in [4], and its relations of the fuzzy coalitional games with transferable utility are 
formulated in [5, 6]. Regarding the superadditivity and core, which are in the pre­
sented paper formalized even for the proper fuzzy extensions (J, W), their properties 
are different from those presented in the previous sections. 
There exists a relation between both fuzzifications of the NTU coalition games. 
Namely, each proper fuzzy coalitional game (J, W) can be transferred into the fuzzy 
coalitional game (J, W) of the type considered in this section by means of the relation 
VK C J,Vx G R n , KK(X) = SUP{TT%(V(K))\V(K) G V(K),X G V(K)} . (7.5) 
It is not difficult to verify the following statement. 
Theorem 7.1. If (J.W) is a proper fuzzy extension of (J, Vo) and if (J, W) is 
derived from it by means of (7.5) then (I,W) fulfills (7.1)-(7.4). 
P r o o f . Condition (7.1) follows directly from Definition 3.2 and (7.5), and (7.2) 
is an immediate consequence of (2.1). Property (7.3) is fulfilled due to (2.3) and 
(7.5), and (7.4) follows from (2.2), the definition of mapping V, and (7.5). • 
Generally and rather heuristically, it is possible to say that the approach suggested 
in this paper appears more natural and its reflection of the intuitively expected 
behavior of the fuzzification of a coalitional game is more immediate. For example, 
the superadditivity of (J, W) is defined, analogously to Definition 2.2; that is, by 
means of the fuzzy set theoretical inclusion and intersection 
W(K U L ) D W(K) H W(L) (7.6) 
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for any pair of disjoint coalitions. In fact, relation (7.6) regards fuzzy sets but it is a 
crisp relation quite suppressing the fuzzy character of the game model. In [4, 5, 6], 
some additional concepts based on the method of a-cuts had to be introduced to 
bring the fuzziness into the model of superadditivity of (/, W). On the contrary, 
the superadditivity of (J, W) presented above and following from the properties of 
games forming a fuzzy class, is naturally a fuzzy property. 
Similarly, also the concept of the core of (7, W) must be supported by rather ar-
tificial concept of so called essential domination to achieve intuitively natural prop-
erties as shown in [4]. Even then the fuzzy superoptimum gains some incomfortable 
properties (e.g., the degree of membership of its elements need not be increasing 
nor non-decreasing). The fuzzy core defined in Section 6 of this paper gains quite 
natural properties directly thanks to the method of its construction. 
The facts mentioned here show that it could be useful to pay attention to the 
fuzzification of the coalitional games which is of the type discussed in the previous 
sections. 
8. CONCLUSION 
Probably the most significant general conclusion following from the previous sections 
is formulated in Section 7. The methodology based on the processing of fuzzy classes 
of complete NTU games, and based on the fuzzification of the classes V(K) seems 
to be natural and better manageable than other methods of the fuzzification of the 
pay-offs of NTU (and, perhaps, not only NTU) coalitional games. 
For the processing of the fuzzified games, this method offers the well managed 
apparatus of the deterministic games which can be fully applied and then turned into 
its fuzzy counterpart by means of its extension to the class (and its fuzzy subclass) 
of games realized over the same set of players. 
The fuzzification method presented here can be probably modified also for the 
transferable utility coalitional games which are treated in [4, 5, 6] by means of fuzzy 
quantities theory. Even in this case, probably, the results achieved by the processing 
of fuzzy subclasses of essentially deterministic games can be different from those 
presented in the referred publications. Anyhow, even the comparison of both groups 
of results and analysis of their differences can bring an interesting information about 
the essential structures of the vagueness in the coalitional games. Further analysis 
of the model is needed for finding whether it promises new contribution to our 
knowledge in general cooperative situations. 
(Received March 19, 2002.) 
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